Total factor productivity (TFP) growth allows for additional healthcare services under restricted resources. We examine whether hospital policy can stimulate hospital TFP growth. We exploit variation across German federal states in the period 1993-2013. State governments decide on hospital capacity planning (number of hospitals, departments, and beds), ownership, medical students, and hospital investment funding. We show that TFP growth in German hospital care reflects quality improvements rather than increases in output volumes. Second-stage regression results indicate that reducing the length of stay is generally a proper way to foster TFP growth. The effects of other hospital policies depend on the reimbursement scheme: Under activity-based (German Diagnosis-related Group) hospital funding, scope-related policies (privatization and specialization) come with TFP growth. Under fixed daily rate funding, scale matters to TFP (hospital size and occupancy rates). Differences in capitalization in East and West Germany allow to show that deepening capital may enhance TFP growth if capital is scarce. We also show that there is less scope for hospital policies after large-scale restructurings of the hospital sector.
generally a proper way to foster hospital TFP growth. The effects of other policies depend on the reimbursement scheme: Under activity-based hospital funding, privatization and specialization come with TFP growth. Under fixed daily rate reimbursement, TFP growth accompanies increases in hospital size and in occupancy rates. Public investment funding and training medical students seem not to affect hospital TFP growth. We elaborate on East and West Germany separately. In West Germany, capital is scarce, and substituting labor by capital enhances TFP growth. Non-findings for the entirely restructured and modernized hospital sector in East Germany after re-unification indicate that there is less scope for hospital policies after large-scale reforms.
This study adds further aspects to the literature. First, we document substantial long-run differences in regional hospital productivity growth and policy. Previous studies show regional variation in healthcare supply (e.g., Skinner, 2012; Kopetsch and Schmitz, 2014; Finkelstein et al., 2016) , but only few cross-sectional studies focus on regional differentials in the productivity of health services (Schleiniger, 2008; Bojke et al., 2013) . We rely on a rich panel dataset covering German hospital development of about 20 years. This allows us to exploit temporal differences in regional TFP growth rates. Second, our study bridges hospital-level TFP studies (seminally, Färe et al., 1994a ; for an overview, see Hollingsworth, 2008) 1 and studies using national accounts (Cromwell and Pope, 1989; Cylus and Dickensheets, 2008; Harper et al., 2010; Gu and Morin, 2014) . Being the sole exceptions, de Nicola et al. (2013) and Aragon Aragon et al. (2015) examine productivity at the regional level. We exploit policy and productivity differences across regions; the 16 German federal states (Bundesländer) constitute our decision-making units of interest. Regional aggregation allows to use considerably more precise measures than at the hospital level (e.g., capital stocks).
2 Aggregated data also internalize spatial correlations between hospitals arising from patient transfers, geography, and socio-demographic idiosyncrasies (Baltagi and Yen, 2014) to a large extent. We use two different TFP measures that allow us to decompose output growth into TFP and input growth contributions (Törnqvist index) , and to further decompose TFP growth into efficiency and technological change (Malmquist index) . Few general productivity studies (Färe et al., 1994b; Kim and Park, 2006) and no healthcare-related study have applied both Törnqvist and Malmquist TFP. Third, only few hospital TFP studies use a second-stage regression to examine drivers of productivity (Dimas et al., 2012; Castelli et al., 2015) . The panel structure of our dataset allows us to control for socio-demographic control variables, state-fixed effects, and time-fixed effects in order to isolate sources of hospital TFP growth more precisely.
HOSPITAL POLICY IN GERMANY
In Germany, hospital policy is shared among the central government and the 16 state governments. The central government is limited to setting the financial framework, in particular, designing hospital reimbursement schemes for current expenditures. As the most important hospital reform among the last decades, the central government changed hospital reimbursement from fixed daily (per diem) rates to activity-based financing (German Diagnosis-related Group (DRG)) nationwide in 2004. State governments, by contrast, decide on hospital capacity plans, allocate funds on hospital investments, run university hospitals, and train medical students (Wassener, 2002; Bremner, 2011; Ettelt et al., 2012; Mätzke, 2013) . German state governments thus 'play an active part in day-to-day health policy' (Wassener, 2002, p. 99) .
We identify six different policies of state governments, which may have an effect on hospital productivity (Figure 1 ). First, ownership may matter to productivity. Privatization of hospitals is mentioned as a strategy to induce efficiency, even though evidence is mixed (Tiemann et al., 2012) . We use the state-level share of private-for-profit hospitals to measure privatization, 3 yielding a spread from 0% (Saarland) to 70% (Hamburg) in 2013 (Figure 1(a) , left-hand side). By contrast, the share of public hospitals decreases for decades (Figure 1 (a), right-hand side). The hospitals remaining are private non-profit.
Second, German state governments determine the number of hospitals, beds, and departments (hospital capacity planning). Some hospital plans even include the precise number of beds of all departments and all hospitals (either public, private-for-profit, or private non-profit) within the state. Enlarging or stipulating hospital mergers may induce scale effects that in turn enhance productivity (Bazzoli, 2008 ; empirical evidence is mixed, see Gaynor et al., 2012) . The average hospital size varies substantially across the states, ranging from 170 beds per hospital (Schleswig-Holstein) to 370 beds per hospital (Thuringia) in 2013 (Figure 1(b) ).
Third, hospital capacity plans also describe the specialization of hospitals. Specialization may stimulate TFP if gains from expertise outweigh the economies of scope from joint production . We use the normalized Gini index of hospital beds in 18 hospital departments (state aggregates) (Figure 1(c) ). The larger this index, the more the state hospital sector is specialized in a certain discipline, for example, heart disease. Specialization decreases between 1993 and 2013 and, again, varies across states.
Fourth, German state governments allocate funds on hospital investment (Pilny, 2016) . New technologies, financed by state investment funding, may increase hospital TFP growth. Figure 1 (d) however shows that the state budget share for hospital investment funding decreases in all states between 1993 and 2013.
Fifth, German states determine the number of medical students in universities (Figure 1(e) ). Training medical students consumes resources and may hamper TFP at least in the short run (Grosskopf et al., 2001; Castelli et al., 2015) .
Sixth, shortening the average length of stay, increasing the occupation rate, and deepening capital are often mentioned as productivity enhancing strategies but are mainly the responsibility of hospital managers. The left hand and center graph of Figure 1 (f) show that the average length of stay converges, whereas occupation rates seem to diverge in Germany. Health policy can induce some pressure. The occupation rate depends on the number and spatial distribution of hospital beds, which is a result of capacity planning. The length of stay is a key element in many hospital plans, for example, in the state of Hesse (Section 17 of the Hessian hospital act). Although less visible, state politicians also exert informal pressure on hospitals. The mix of capital and labor is also mainly determined by hospital managers but depends on the legal and financial framework (e.g., construction and hygiene standards). Deepening capital has been shown to increase hospital TFP to some extent (Gu and Morin, 2014) . Figure 1 (f) (right-hand side) shows the capital intensity in three groups of German states. The sharp increase in capital intensity in the five East German states is a result of massive investments after the re-unification. Capital intensity increases steadily in the 10 West German states. As an outlier, the once over-sized hospital sector in the formerly divided city of Berlin convergences toward the German average. 4 Altogether, German states vary substantially in different aspects of hospital policy. In the remaining part of the paper, we study whether these differences translate into differences in hospital TFP growth. We also examine the party affiliation of the health minister. Left-wing parties favor equality and redistribution rather than competition and run a larger public sector than their right-wing counterparts.
5 Left-wing health ministers may thus impose less pressure on hospitals than their right-wing colleagues. Previous studies show that spatial distribution of hospital beds is more equally distributed across German states that are governed by a left-wing party (Bennema-Broos et al., 2001) . We hypothesize that incentives to enhance productivity are lower under left-wing state health ministers.
METHODS
We follow a two-stage strategy. In the first stage, we calculate the annual productivity change of the state hospital sector. We adopt the Malmquist and the Törnqvist indices. In the second stage, we use a fixed effects panel regression to reveal policies that coincide with productivity gains. We use state-level aggregates throughout the entire analysis.
Total factor productivity
Total factor productivity change refers to changes in outputs that cannot be attributed to shifts in inputs. We use two deterministic concepts in measuring TFP, representing a frontier (Malmquist index) and a non-frontier approach (Törnqvist index) . 6 The Törnqvist index allows to decompose output growth into TFP and input growth contributions. The Malmquist index, by contrast, allows to decompose TFP growth into efficiency and technological change. Multiple decision-making units can be benchmarked by the index concept described by Malmquist (1953) (Caves et al., 1982; Färe et al., 1994b) . The (output-oriented) Malmquist index in period t is the ratio of two distance functions measuring the maximal proportional change of the input-output combination of the previous period (x t À 1 , y t À 1 ) (denominator) and of the current period (x t , y t ) (numerator), holding the 4 The division of Berlin induced a massive oversupply in hospital care because both the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany run a full-sized hospital sector for each part of the city. 5 Vatter and Rüefli (2003) and Herwatz and Theilen (2014) show higher health expenditures under left-wing governments. Potrafke (2010) however does not reveal significant partisan differences in healthcare expenditures. 6 Econometric and thus non-deterministic approaches such as the stochastic frontier analysis control for random shocks but rely on a large set of econometric assumptions (Del Gatto et al., 2011) . Because we investigate data at the state level, idiosyncratic shocks to productivity at the hospital level are internalized to large extent, and econometric methods are not adequate for our study design. 
We use the data envelopment analysis to compute Malmquist productivity indices. This allows to decompose MQ t into changes in efficiency (EFFCH) and into a frontier effect (TECHCH). The non-frontier index concept of Törnqvist (1936) can be derived as a special case of the Malmquist index (Färe et al., 1994b) and is roughly equivalent to the growth-accounting framework of Solow (1957) . We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function and compute the Törnqvist TFP by logarithmic transformation. The Törnqvist TFP can be written as the difference of (logarithmic computed) output growth rates and cost share-weighted 8 input growth rates:
α n;t ln x n;t x n;tÀ1 :
3.2. Inputs and outputs 3.2.1. Output. Studies on hospital TFP vary substantially in outputs and inputs (for a synopsis, see Table S1 in the Supporting Information). 9 We run separate TFP calculations for three different output measures: the number of discharges, a quality index, and the quality-adjusted number of discharges (outcome).
10 First, we use the annual number of inpatient discharges according to the strict separation of the inpatient hospital sector and the outpatient healthcare sector in Germany. The length of stay, in contrast, will be used here as an explanatory variable only in the second-stage regression.
11 Second, we construct a quality index that reflects mortality. According to Varabyova and Schreyögg (2013) , successful treatments and quality improvements in hospital care materialize in decreases in hospital mortality. Our quality index increases from t to t + 1 as the difference in growth rates of the inpatient mortality rate and the overall population mortality rate decreases. Subtracting overall population mortality accounts for health improvements that lie beyond hospital care (e.g., higher level of fitness and fewer smokers). 12 We use in-hospital mortality rates because the 30-day mortality rate as the preferable measure is not available. Data aggregation at the state level however absorbs idiosyncratic local events and re-admissions to a large extent. Third, we define hospital outcome (quality-adjusted discharges) as the product of the number of discharges and the mortality-based quality index.
7 Färe et al. (1994b) propose to subtract 1 from MQ to compute TFP. However, for small TFP (in absolute terms), both methods yield almost identical results. Using logarithmic transformation is more similar to the Törnqvist index. 8 The weights α n,t in period t are given by the costs of input n in relation to total costs. As common in productivity analysis, we calculate weights as the mean of the current period t and the previous period t À 1. 9 For a more general discussion on measuring healthcare inputs and outputs, see Newhouse (1994) , Bloor and Maynard (2006) , Castelli et al. (2007) , and Hollingsworth (2008) . 10 For reasons of simplicity, we derive the quality index-based TFP as the difference of outcome-based TFP and output volume-based TFP. 11 We treat the length of stay as a main characteristic of a discharge but not as an output itself. Using the length of stay as an additional output does not allow to calculate TFP rates based on the Törnqvist index because explicit index weights of discharges and the length of stay are not derivable. Results of the second-stage regression however do not change to large extent when we use the length of stay as an additional output in the Malmquist framework and exclude the length of stay from the second-stage regression. For details, see the Supporting Information (Table S6) . 12 For example, if the in-hospital mortality rate decreases by 10% and the overall population mortality rate decreases by 7%, the hospitalrelated decrease in hospital mortality amounts to 10% À 7% = 3%. The quality index increases from 100 to (100 × 1.03) = 103.
3.2.2. Labor. We observe full-time equivalents of three types of labor input: physicians, nurses, and other staff. The labor cost share is the ratio of total wages and total costs. Törnqvist labor growth is the sum of growth rates of each labor type, weighted by the 2-year average wage share of each labor type (see Cromwell and Pope, 1989; O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009 ).
3.2.3. Capital. Fast-moving medical progress leads to an enormous increase in capital quality that is not captured by the number of hospital beds. We use self-compiled capital stocks for the hospital sector of all 16 states that reflect both capital quantity and quality. Our long-term investment series for each of the 16 states are based on a large set of data sources (Section 4 and Table S3 in the Supporting Information). 13 We apply the perpetual inventory method (Schmalwasser and Schidlowski, 2006; OECD, 2009 ) and calculate capital stocks in constant prices as the sum of non-retired investments of prior periods. Further details are provided in the Supporting Information. We compute the cost share of capital as the share of our estimated depreciation and interest payments.
Intermediate goods.
Intermediate hospital goods such as food, medical goods, water, power, and fuel supplies are essential to hospital production. We follow the KLEMS 14 approach (O'Mahony and Timmer, 2009) and use separate series for energy (including water supply and the like), materials, and service expenses in constant prices. We deflate energy expenses using the state-level consumer price index for energy and fuel.
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Material expenses are deflated by the gross domestic product (GDP) price index, and services are deflated by the GDP-based price index for services. Cost shares for each type of intermediate goods are given by their 2-year average cost shares.
Second-stage regression
We use the TFP growth rates derived in the first step as the dependent variable in a second-stage regression. We include time and state-fixed effects. State-fixed effects cover unobservable heterogeneity across German states (i.e., attitudes toward health and social care). Time effects eliminate effects of national reforms that affect all states simultaneously. We use growth rates of all variables to ensure stationarity, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors as proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980) , and mean 1993-2013 state population as regression weights. 16 Our Ordinary least squares (OLS) model takes the following form:
where TFP i,t represents the annual productivity change of state i in period t. α i and δ t define state-fixed and year-fixed effects. ε i,t is the error term. P is a vector of the hospital policies shown in Figure 1 ; all variables are included in growth rates: the share of public hospitals and the share of private-for-profit hospitals (private non-profit hospitals being the base category), the average hospital size in a federal state, a specialization measure (Gini index of beds in 18 state-aggregated hospital departments), the state budget share of hospital funding, and the number of students of human medicine. We also include a dummy for left-wing health ministers. 17 Finally, vector P includes hospital policy-induced measures. These are the length of stay, the occupancy, and capital intensity (ratio of capital stock and total staff). 13 In Germany, no data on capital or investments of the hospital sector are collected, even at the national level. 14 KLEMS is the abbreviation for K: capital, L: labour, E: energy, M: materials, and S: services. 15 If price indices for energy are not available at the state level, we instead apply the national counterpart. However, state-level and national price indices for energy only differ to small extent in Germany. 16 Weighting accounts for substantial differences in state population. Inferences basically do not change when we use unweighted regressions. 17 The dummy for left-wing health ministers equals 1 if the minister is affiliated with one of the left-wing parties SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen or Die Linke, and 0 otherwise. patient flows between the states, and socio-demographic issues that may drive regional hospital demand (old-age dependency ratio, unemployment rate, and GDP per capita). We also include the ratio of outpatient and inpatient physicians to capture substitutional (or complementary) effects between the hospital and the outpatient sector. Figure 2 gives an impression of our dataset (Table S2 in Table I shows the mean growth rates of hospital TFP based on the number of discharges, on the quality index, and on outcome serving as output measure each (panel A). For sensitivity analyses, we also replace our input measures by conventionally used measures such as total staff, hospital beds, and total intermediates (panel B).
RESULTS

Total factor productivity growth
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We focus on outcome-based productivity that reflects output quantity and quality and derive three main results. First, hospitals realize a substantial increase in outcome-related TFP of 0.48% (Malmquist, column (5) , third row) to 1.30% (Törnqvist, column (4) ). The difference between Malmquist and Törnqvist TFP is mainly driven by the factor capital in East Germany. The exceptionally large growth rates in East German capital stocks in the 1990s shift the Malmquist index of East Germany and overall Germany downwards. In West Germany, Malmquist TFP (1.11%) equals Törnqvist TFP (1.09%) (for details, see Table S4 in the Supporting Information). Given that the Törnqvist index is more reliable than the Malmquist index, TFP growth can be seen as the by far most important contribution to hospital outcome growth in Germany. Total input growth contributes 1.13% to outcome growth (sum of columns (1)- (3)). Figure 3 shows that TFP growth rates vary over time. Growth rates decrease monotonically until 2004. Since 2004, TFP growth re-increases. This turnaround corresponds with the introduction of the DRG system in 2004. We will discuss differences in subperiods in more detail later on.
Second, gains in hospital TFP entirely stem from improvements in quality, which is in line with the results of Arocena and García-Prado (2007) . Productivity growth in quality is larger than 0.8% per year in all specifications (columns (4) and (5)). Output-input ratios of the number of discharges, by contrast, stagnate over time (À0.05%, column (4)). Thus, TFP growth in German hospital care stems from quality improvements rather than from increases in output volumes.
Third, hospital TFP growth is a result of technological progress rather than efficiency induced. Technological progress (TECHCH, the shift of the frontier) contributes 0.32% to outcome-based Malmquist TFP (column (7)); efficiency (EFFCH) contributes 0.16%. Thus, movements toward the technological frontier seem to play only a minor role for hospital TFP. Figure 3 underpins this finding. The evolution of Malmquist TECHCH (lower graphics, right-hand side) parallels the trend of TFP growth. By contrast, Malmquist EFFCH varies little over time and does not parallel TFP. We observe a similar evolution of the Törnqvist and the Malmquist index, At a first glance, hospital TFP in Germany seems to be a result of technologically induced improvements in quality. However, later, we examine the sources of TFP growth in a second-stage regression in more detail and show also that healthcare policies by state governments play an important role.
Effects of hospital policies
We link TFP growth rates to hospital policy in a second-stage regression. Table II shows our baseline results. Törnqvist TFP, Malmquist TFP, EFFCH, and TECHCH are the dependent variables. Because of their high correlations, all TFP measures yield similar results in many cases. Again, we mainly refer to outcome-based productivity results (columns (9)-(12)).
We find significant effects of specialization and hospital size on Törnqvist TFP rates and on Malmquist subindices. Enlarging hospital size is positively and significantly correlated with the catch-up effect (EFFCH) in terms of quality (columns (7) and (11)). At the same time, larger hospitals are also associated with less technological progress (TECHCH) (columns (4) and (12)). This finding follows the conventional economic intuition of a trade-off between scale effects but less innovation when enlarging production. Both effects cancel out in the case of the Malmquist TFP corroborating micro-level evidence (e.g., Gaynor et al., 2012) . Productivity gains also accompany specialization. This is in line with economic intuition: Focusing on certain disciplines allows to produce to a higher quality and quantity. This effect is significant for the Törnqvist TFP (columns (1), (5), and (9)), and Malmquist EFFCH (columns (3) and (11)). Again, however, both effects cancel out for Malmquist TFP.
Coefficients for other policy measures such as ownership, hospital funding, or training medical students do only occasionally turn out to be significant but do not seem to have a systematic impact. The same holds true 21 In West Germany, the correlation amounts to 0.89. The table shows the results of second-stage regressions using output, quality, and outcome-based TFP calculations as the dependent variable (columns (1)- (4): output, columns (5)- (8): quality, and columns (9)- (12): outcome). The unit of observation is the 16 German states. All variables are in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy variables). Average state population 1993-2013 serves as regression weight. TFP, total factor productivity. Significance levels (robust standard errors) are as follows:
for our socio-economic control variables. Given that Törnqvist TFP is less biased by the large capital growth rates in East Germany in the 1990s and therefore more reliable than Malmquist TFP, our results indicate that hospital size and specialization are the main policy forces of hospital TFP growth. Governments can influence these variables directly via hospital capacity planning.
In almost all specifications, we also find a substantial and significant correlation between policy-induced measures and productivity. In terms of outcome, a decrease of 1% in the average length of stay is associated with an increase of 0.9-1.2% in hospital productivity (columns (9) and (10)), which is in line with recent studies (Ashby et al., 2000; Dimas et al., 2012; Castelli et al., 2015) . The occupancy rate also turns out to be significant in several specifications, especially in the case of the number of discharges and outcome-based productivity. Increasing hospital occupancy by 1% comes with an increase in productivity of about 0.3% (columns (9) and (10)). We do not find effects of the capital intensity for the overall sample.
Large-scale reorganizations
The re-unification of Germany in 1990 allows us to examine the effects of hospital policies after large-scale reorganizations. After re-unification, the East German hospital sector was drastically reshaped and downscaled. Also, enormous investments were made to modernize the outworn capital stock. East German state governments were able to design and to implement an efficiently scaled hospital sector overnight, which is in stark contrast to the more evolutionary slow-moving reforms in West Germany.
We elaborate on West and East Germany separately. The results in Table III show that the length of stay and the occupancy rate matter to outcome-based TFP growth in both regions.
22 By contrast, we do not find any robust correlation of hospital policies and hospital TFP growth in East Germany. 23 The consolidation of the East German hospital sector in 1990 included closures and reorganizations of departments among all hospitals according to future needs. We conclude that gains from further reforms are low in the aftermath of large-scale hospital sector reorganizations.
In West Germany, by contrast, significant correlations of TFP growth and almost all policy variables imply that further healthcare reforms might be valuable source of productivity growth. However, political barriers may hinder consolidations. Productivity growth in West German hospitals is significantly lower under leftwing health ministers. Favoring a larger public sector, left-wing health ministers may impose less pressure on hospitals than right-wing health ministers. In East Germany, partisanship does not play a role that is consistent with the fact that the hospital sector is consolidated and there is less ideological conflict (Potrafke, 2013) . We also find that increases in capital intensity come with increases in hospital TFP in West Germany, where a general shortage in hospital capital is reported. In the modernized East German hospital sector, by contrast, increases in capital intensity do not stimulate TFP growth anymore. Thus, deepening capital may enhance hospital productivity as long as the hospital sector suffers from a shortage in capital.
Reimbursement schemes
We also exploit the nationwide change in hospital reimbursement from fixed daily (per diem) rates to activity-based financing (DRG) in 2004. 24 We interact all variables with a dummy variable for the DRG period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) to study whether effects depend on different reimbursement schemes. In Table IV , we present the effects of hospital policies for the period of fixed daily (per diem) rates and for DRG reimbursement separately. In columns (9)- (12), we test whether differences between both periods are statistically different from 0. Corroborating all findings so far, the average length of stay is strongly negatively associated with TFP growth before and after 2004. Introducing DRG, however, almost tripled the coefficient; the difference of about 0.9-1.0 is significantly different from 0, at least at the 5% level (columns (9) and 
(8) 
(8) Obs. The table shows the results of second-stage regressions by subperiods using outcome-based TFP calculations as the dependent variable. Results come from a model using the interaction of policy measures and a dummy that equals 1 for activity-based hospital funding (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , and 0 otherwise. Columns (1)- (4) show the effects for the period prior to the introduction of activity-based hospital funding (DRG) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . Columns (5)- (8) show the effects for the period afterwards. Columns (9)-(12) take the differences between both periods. Coefficients for the constant and the interaction dummies are left out. All variables are in growth rates (with exceptions of the dummy variables). Average state population 1993-2013 serves as regression weight. TFP, total factor productivity; DRG, German Diagnosis-related Group. Significance levels (robust standard errors) are as follows: ***0.01,(10)). Under activity-based hospital financing, incentives to reduce the length of stay are much higher than under a fixed daily base rate (O'Reilly et al., 2012) . The effect of other policies, by contrast, depends on the reimbursement scheme. Under fixed daily rates, increases in occupancy rates and hospital size are significantly correlated with TFP growth (columns (1)-(3) ). Larger and highly utilized hospitals allow for more treatment days, which is in line with financial incentives from fixed daily reimbursement. By contrast, coefficients of specialization, privatization, and other policy measures do not turn out to be significant. This finding inverts under DRG funding: The occupancy rate and hospital size do not have a systematic effect on TFP growth (columns (5)- (8)). Instead, we find that DRG funding induces incentives to focus on discharges rather than on treatment days in a profit maximization context. An increase of the share of private hospitals of 1% is associated with a significant increase in hospital productivity of 0.06%. Also, specialization comes with gains in productivity (columns (5)- (7)). Specialization leads to expertise that in turn materializes in a greater quantity and quality of discharges using a given input mix. Patient mobility provides further evidence for this channel. Under DRG funding, a larger share of patients moving to another state to receive hospital treatments is significantly correlated with increases in TFP growth (columns (5) and (6)). This indicates that the selection of patients into state hospital sectors according to the different specializations has increased. If specialized treatments are not provided by nearby hospitals in a certain state, patients might be better off to move to another state. DRG-induced reductions of the length of stay may also have deepened the links to the outpatient sector. We find a positive and significant correlation of TFP growth and the share of outpatient by inpatient physicians for the DRG period only (columns (5) and (6)). To sum up, the effects of hospital policies on productivity growth highly depend on the reimbursement scheme: Scale-related policies (hospital size and occupancy rates) matter under fixed daily rates funding; scope (specialization and privatization) drives TFP growth under DRG funding.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study policy determinants of hospital productivity growth in Germany. We find that quality improvements rather than increases in quantity volumes generate TFP growth in hospital care. In any case, reducing the length of stay is a proper way to enhance hospital TFP. The effects of other hospital policies depend on the reimbursement scheme: Scope-related policies (privatization and specialization) come with TFP growth under activity-based hospital funding. Under fixed daily rate reimbursement, scale (hospital size and occupancy rates) matters to TFP growth. These results imply that hospital reform measures should always be in line with reimbursement incentives. The case of East Germany also shows that large-scale reforms can be a perfect equivalent for incremental changes. After drastic consolidations of the hospital sector, there is less scope for further effects of hospital policy.
Our study derives insights from the frontier Malmquist approach and from the non-frontier Törnqvist approach. We also show that TFP calculations are more sensitive to different measures of inputs and outputs rather than to different index concepts. Malmquist and the Törnqvist TFP are correlated by 0.80 for the entire period and for all states. We conclude that the strictly neoclassical assumptions of the Törnqvist index hold despite the very high level of state regulation of the hospital sector. By contrast, using hospital beds as capital input may bias productivity rates upwards because the number of beds does not reflect capital quality.
Limitations of this study may encourage further research. First, our input measures capture quality as best as possible, whereas output quality was proxied by in-hospital mortality. Further studies on hospital TFP may elaborate on more precise output measures. Second, studies on hospital TFP should use more precise measures and test different methods in measuring TFP for robustness exercises. The well-developed survey of Del Gatto et al. (2011) outlines a global picture of TFP methodology that has not been systematically discussed with respect to healthcare issues.
